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Abstract - In a stimulating paper Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) argued how a decision maker could 
undertake dynamically inconsistent choices when, in an extensive form decision problem, she exhibits a 
particular type of imperfect recall named absentmindedness. Such imperfection obtains whenever an 
information set includes histories along the same decision path. Starting from work focusing on the 
Absentminded Driver example, and independently developed by Segal (2000) and Dimitri (1999), the main 
theorem of this paper provides a general result of dynamically consistent choices, valid for a large class of 
finite extensive form decision problems without nature.    
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The issue of dynamic consistency in Finite Extensive Form Decision 
Problems (FEFDP) has recently been at the centre of a very interesting debate. 
The discussion was stimulated by a paper of Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) 
(P&R) where, in absence of changes in the decision maker (DM) preferences, 
imperfect recall was identified as a source for possible inconsistent choices, in 
particular by the type of limited memory denominated absentmindedness. 
Such memory limitation is the case when the DM can not distinguish among 
decision histories along the same path. Piccione and Rubinstein argued that 
upon reaching an information set characterised by absentmindedness, the DM 
might be induced, somehow “paradoxically”, to revise her original optimal 
plan. A number of authors Aumann-Hart-Perry (1997), Battigalli (1997), 
Gilboa (1997), Lipman (1997) have discussed how an approach based on the 
view that the DM is a collection of different selves could justify these choices, 
along the decision tree, as a Nash Equilibrium profile of actions taken by the 
various selves.  
Within a one self framework, an alternative route leading to dynamic 
consistency has been independently undertaken by Segal (2000) and Dimitri 
(1999). Starting from the celebrated example of the Absentminded Driver they   2
argue in support of two main assumptions, which are not part of P&R 
analysis, that would fully incorporate the DM awareness of possibly being 
absentminded along the decision tree. Broadly speaking, the first concerns 
consistency of beliefs with respect to the revised strategy, while the other is a 
condition of perceived welfare symmetry once at an information set where 
absentmindedness is exhibited. In short, belief consistency rests on the 
consideration that, upon reaching an information set with absentmindedness, 
it would be difficult to make sense of the view that passage from one node to 
another, within the set, is governed by the behavioural strategy adopted prior 
to entering that set and not by the (possibly) revised one. The second is based 
on the observation that, once having reached such an information set, unless 
further elements would be introduced the DM should associate the same game 
value at all nodes in that set since, otherwise, she would think of having the 
ability to disentangle the nodes that she is finding herself at.      
  This paper generalises the result to a large class of FEFDP where nature 
is not present, this because we only want to concentrate on the possibility of 
inconsistent behaviour due to cognitive limitations. The problems we 
consider incorporate straightforward generalisations of absentmindedness, 
but do not investigate the role of partial memory limitation. On this point, 
recent work by Kline (2002) established minimum memory conditions for ex-
ante optimal strategies to be dynamically consistent. The paper is organised 
as follows. In part one of Section 2 we introduce and discuss the above two 
main cognitive-behavioural assumptions, within the “classical” example of   3
the Absentminded Driver. Section 3 specifies the basics of the general model. In 
Section 4 we define dynamic consistency and the generalised versions of the 
two main assumptions. Section 5 presents the main result of the work while 
Section 6 discusses possible extensions and concludes the paper.  
 
2. THE “CONSISTENT” ABSENTMINDED DRIVER1 
 
2.1 The Absentminded Driver 
 
We begin this section by recalling the original version of the 
Absentminded Driver problem (AMD henceforth), the motivating example of 
P&R analysis. The game is as in Fig 1 below. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The payoffs associated to terminal histories of the extensive form 
decision problem reveal that her goal is to obtain 4, the highest reward. There 
is absentmindedness since the driver upon reaching one of the two nodes 
(highway junctions), I and II, is unable to distinguish between them. More 
specifically she has a single information set, indicated by the dotted line 
connecting nodes I and II. As a manifestation of imperfect recall, the 
peculiarity of absentmindedness rests in the fact that information sets contain 
decision points (two in the case of the AMD problem) along the same path. 
                                                 
1 This section draws from Dimitri (1999).     4
Actions available at each intersection are either c {continue} or e {exit}; hence, 
the AMD goal is achieved if and only if the sequence of actions ce (in this 
precise order) would be chosen. 
In this simplest decision problem P&R detect the possibility of time-
inconsistent choices when both pure and (randomised) behavioural strategies 
are considered. Namely, the plan (on how to choose within the game) formed 
by AMD before she starts playing may be revised, in spite of unchanged 
preferences, upon reaching the information set.   
This last observation makes dynamic inconsistency a key conceptual 
issue in the game, in need of further investigation. Indeed, since Strotz (1956), 
a common explanation for dynamic inconsistency has been given by change 
in preferences. Hence, on the one hand, since in the problem AMD tastes 
remain stable along the decision path, here inconsistency would be 
exclusively due to the type of imperfect memory under consideration; 
namely, only to a purely cognitive aspect. On the other hand, P&R notice, in the 
model there’s an evident tension between the ex-ante and the ex-post 
individual’s choice, in the following sense. As AMD is ex-ante aware of her 
own ex-post absentmindedness why should she plan an optimal strategy, 
before entering the game, if she can anticipate that she may have an incentive 
to deviate from it once at the information set? As a consequence why, for 
example, isn’t AMD considering only either the ex-ante or the ex-post 
strategy? With the possibility of time inconsistency in extensive form games it 
is the standard notion of strategy, defined as a contingent (to each   5
information set) plan of actions made at the beginning of the game, that 
comes to be put under scrutiny. In extensive form decision games with perfect 
information the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post strategies is 
irrelevant since, ex-post, players have no incentive to deviate from a 
previously formed optimal plan of actions. With absentmindedness instead 
the alleged distinction becomes meaningful and the notion of optimal strategy 
may be an issue.   
Since absentmindedness represents a very specific type of imperfect 
recall, it is not unreasonable to imagine that different DM may entertain 
alternative views on how to deal with such a particular cognitive limitation. 
Then, in principle, we see it as acceptable that inconsistency might emerge in 
some of the approaches but not necessarily in all of them. Indeed, we very 
much share the view, made explicit by P&R and Lipman (1997), that there 
may be more than one plausible way to model a decision maker’s mental 
process in this game.  
  Let’s now discuss, somewhat informally, the P&R argument 
supporting the possibility of inconsistency in behavioural strategies. In what 
follows p will be the ex-ante (planned before the game starts) probability of 
choosing action c {continue}, 1-p the probability of action e {exit} at each node 
(in the behavioural strategy), q the ex-post (at the information set) probability 
of choosing c, 1-q the probability of choosing e and α  the  subjective 
probabilistic belief of AMD to be at node I, conditional to having reached the 
information set. Moreover Π(p) and Π(q) indicate, respectively, the ex-ante   6
and ex-post expected payoffs for AMD; finally, Π(q⎟ I) and Π(q⎟ II) stand for 
the expected payoffs conditional to, respectively, node I and II.  
 
i) Ex-ante Before the game starts AMD expected payoff is Π(p)=p(4-3p), since 
she would face a lottery that with probabilities 1-p, p(1-p) and p2 provides her 
with payoffs (respectively) equal to 0, 4 and 1. Straightforward maximisation 
of  p(4-3p)  leads to p*=2/3 as the optimal behavioural strategy planned to 
follow, once at the information set.     
 
ii) Ex-post Conditional to being at the information set AMD expected payoff 
instead becomes  Π(q)=αΠ(q|I)+(1-α)Π(q|II)=α[q(4-3q)]+(1-α)[4-3q]. Hence, 
maximisation of Π(q) entails that the optimal strategy is now q*=max [0,(7α-
3)/6α], different from p* unless  α=1. Therefore, if  α<1, any behavioural 
strategy would be time inconsistent since p*≠q*; however, inconsistency 
would also be the case if  α=1 t o o  s i n c e ,  b e l i e v i n g  t o  b e  a t  n o d e  I with 
probability one, AMD would presumably choose to continue with certainty 
and so q*=1.  
  
 While  point  (i) is basically uncontroversial, point (ii) has been a main 
s o u r c e  o f  d e b a t e  f o r  i t  i s  o n  t h e  ex-post reasoning of an individual that 
alternative approaches can be contemplated. In particular, since AMD mental 
process is formalised by the expected payoff  α[q(4-3q)]+(1-α)[4-3q], we here 
anticipate that we’ll scrutinise the above expression in the following two main   7
directions. First to incorporate an issue of internal coherency in the 
individual’s mental process, reflected in Assumption 3 (Welfare Symmetry), the 
term αΠ(q|I) will change; this in turn implies that AMD game evaluation at 
the information set will no longer be calculated through the conditional 
expected payoff Π(q|I). The second direction, made explicit by Assumption 4 
(Belief Consistency), will instead propose a definition of α   that, to us, 
represents the most convincing way for the model to embody the 
fundamental issue of the analysis, namely AMD possible reconsideration of 
the ex-ante optimal behavioural strategy upon reaching the information set.  
    We are now ready to discuss in more detail how consistency could 
emerge once the AMD reasoning would fully incorporate the (explicit and 
implicit) model assumptions that we now specify.  
 
Assumption 1 (History-independent information partition) At all non terminal 
histories AMD information partition is the same.   
 
  In extensive form games and decision problems this is the standard 
assumption concerning a DM information processing skills. It is however 
worth stressing it since taken together with the next one (Assumption 2) will 
entail some important implications.  
  Being standard, in P&R Assumption 1 is left implicit; what is made 
explicit  instead is the following Assumption 2.  
   8
Assumption 2 (Awareness2 of Absentmindedness) At all non terminal histories 
AMD is aware of her own absentmindedness, and takes this knowledge into account 
when evaluating her welfare. 
  
Few comments are in order here. Absentmindedness is introduced as 
AMD inability to distinguish between nodes, at all decision histories in the 
problem. Consequently, for both Assumptions 1 and 2 to hold it must 
necessarily be true the further implication that absentmindedness should also 
relate any element that may provide AMD with information concerning the 
node that she is at the moment. The element we are particularly interested in 
stressing is her mental process at decision nodes.  
A possible, informal, argument supporting the point could be the 
following. Suppose that at node II AMD could recall (for example) a 
consideration that she has previously made, which was not at the beginning 
of the game. Then, she would immediately infer to be at node II and the 
information set could not be as the one depicted in Fig. 1.  
We now come to Assumptions 3 and 4, the main ones for the paper 
findings. The versions we give below will later be generalised.   
 
Assumption 3 (Welfare Symmetry) At both decision nodes in the information set 
AMD thinks that her game value is the same at all histories in the set, and equal to  
Π*(q).  
                                                 
2 The notion of (un)awareness is introduced here only on intuitive grounds. 
For a formal treatment of the concept see Modica-Rustichini (1994-1999) and 
Dekel-Lipman-Rustichini (1998).    9
 
Assumption 4 (Belief Consistency) Conditional to having reached the information 
set, the probabilistic belief of being at a particular node is consistent with the 
behavioural strategy chosen at the information set (ex-post) and not before the game 
starts (ex-ante). Formally, if α is AMD’s belief to be at node I then 1-α=αq. This 
would clearly imply that  
α+αq=1  
so that α=1/(1+q).  
 
  The key conceptual finding of the paper is already in the following 
preliminary proposition. 
 
Proposition The ex-post evaluation of the game by AMD is Π*(q)=αqΠ*(q)+(1-α) 
[4-3q], rather than Π(q)=α[q(4-3q)]+(1-α)[4-3q], where α=1/(1+q). Hence, Π(p)= 
p(4-3p) and Π*(q)= q(4-3q) have the same functional form, respectively, in p and q so 
that p*=2/3=q* and AMD is time consistent.  
 
Here’s the argument supporting welfare symmetry. Following the 
proposition, interpret Π*(q) as AMD “value of the problem” conditional to 
being at the information set; we observe that because of Assumptions 1 and 2 
s h e  m u s t  b e l i e v e  o f  e n t e r t a i n i n g  t h e  s a m e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  g a m e  a t  b o t h  
nodes. Indeed, if this was not so, she would imagine to be able to distinguish 
between the two junctions. More specifically, if (with belief α) she is at node I   10
then her game value is Π*(q); moreover, she is aware that should she then 
reach junction II (with probability q) she would have no elements to think that 
she would not replicate exactly the same reasoning, hence ending up with the 
same game value Π*(q). This explains the first term on the right hand side of 
Π*(q). If AMD were instead at node II (with belief 1-α) then she knows that 
the game will end after the next move; as a consequence, at this node the 
game evaluation is given, as in P&R, by (4-3q).       
It is indeed at this very point that our modelling of AMD mental 
process differs from P&R proposal; this i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  
following conceptual tension. If she were to be at node I then she perfectly 
knows that at II she will face a different lottery; P&R are in favour of 
incorporating such information in her welfare calculations and notice that this 
leads to time inconsistent choices. However, if we do this we allow AMD to 
be aware of an element of incoherence in her own reasoning by assuming that 
she anticipates at I the subjective value that she will attach to the game at II 
and yet, in calculating Π*(q), she disregards this information. Still at an 
interpretative level, we could depict the above situation as AMD facing a 
trade-off between being externally (with respect to the data of the problem) vs 
internally (with respect to her own personal evaluation of the game) coherent. 
This paper will suggest that should AMD opt for the latter then time 
consistent choices may emerge.  
Notice that an analogous approach incorporating future welfare in a 
DM calculation, rather than mere expected payoff, has recently been   11
advocated and discussed also by Saez-Marti and Weibull (2002) in work 
concerning time discounting.  
We now argue on beliefs α and 1-α being consistent with q3. Indeed, as 
AMD has no elements to think that her own reasoning is different at the two 
nodes (otherwise, again, she would imagine to be able to detect the nodes), 
she can not but assume that at both junctions she would choose the same ex-
post probability q. Hence, q is the transition probability between I to II and 
consistency between beliefs and behavioural strategies entails 1-α=αq so that 
α=1/(1+q).  
In extensive form games (decision problems) without 
absentmindedness, it is standard to consider beliefs as formed prior to 
players’ actual choices. Namely, conditional to being at an information set, 
beliefs relative to the nodes in the set are independent of the actions taken at 
that set. Because of the above symmetric-reasoning considerations, with 
absentmindedness this may not be so. Conditional beliefs could then be 
imagined to depend upon behavioural strategies chosen at the set and, due to 
the belief consistency assumption, come after them. Failure to accept so may 
entail some drastic consequences; the following is a possible one. Letting 1-α=
αp, would imply imputing to AMD the idea that possible reconsideration of 
her ex-ante optimal strategy can not occur at node I. Indeed, if this was not so 
then AMD could not assume that p is the transition probability between the 
                                                 
3 We stress so since in P&R belief consistency is defined with respect to the 
probabilistic behavioural strategy p* chosen ex-ante. Namely, they require 1-α 
=αp* =α(2/3).    12
two highway junctions. Consequently, AMD would think of deducing to be at 
II and choose q*=0.  
 
3. THE GENERAL MODEL 
 
  We are now ready to pursue the general analysis. We begin so by 
formally defining the relevant elements of a FEFDP provided by P&R (1987) a 
specification, for the case of one player and nature, of the definition of a Finite 
Extensive Form Game given in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).  
 
Definition 1 (FEFDP) Is a five tuple Γ =<H,u,C,ρ,Π> where 
i)  H is a finite set of sequence of actions of the type h=(a1,…,ak), where k 
is a non negative integer. Moreover, H includes the initial history ∅  
and if h∈H then for all its sub-histories h’⊆h it is h’∈H. A sub-history 
h’⊆h of the kind h’=(a1,…,al), with l<k, is called prefix. History h is 
terminal if for no h’∈H is h⊂h’. The set of terminal histories is Z, with 
generic element z∈Z. For all non terminal histories h∈H-Z, the set 
A(h) indicates the actions available to the player (whether DM or 
nature) at h.  
ii)  u: Z→R is a VNM utility function. 
iii)  C⊂H-Z is the set of histories at which chance (nature) moves.  
iv)   for each h∈C the probability with which chance chooses a∈A(h) is ρ(a), 
where ρ(a)>0 for all such a.    13
v)   D=H-Z-C is the set of histories at which the DM moves.  
vi)  the information processing ability of DM is modelled by a partition P 
of D. The element of P containing h∈D, for all such h, is P(h). At all 
h’∈P(h) is A(h)=A(h’). Henceforth, for simplicity, X will be a generic 
(element of P and so) information set; the set A(X) indicates the 
(common) actions available at all histories in X.   
 
Moreover, we also need to introduce the following  
 
Definition 1a In Γ =<H,u,C,ρ,Π>   
 
vii)  Γ(h) indicates the subgame starting from history h, for all h∈H-Z, 
while Γ(X)=∪x∈XΓ(x) is the set of subgames starting from X.     
viii)  b*(h) =bI(D-Γ(X))(h)+b’I(Γ(X)-Z)(h), where I is the standard indicator 
function, stands for a behavioural strategy adopted by DM that 
coincides with the behavioural strategy b’, at all histories h in Γ(X)-Z, 
and with the behavioural strategy b at histories h in D-Γ(X). The set of 
behavioural strategies is B.  
ix)  V(Γ(h)|b) stands for the value of the subgame Γ(h) and, analogously, 
V(X|b) stands for the value of the game at the information set X, when 
in Γ the DM adopts the behavioural strategy b. By V(Γ(∅)|b)=V(Γ|b) 
we denote the value of the whole game.  
x)  the probability of reaching history h’ from history h, according to the 
behavioural strategy b, is p(h’|h,b). We denote p(h’|∅, b) as p(h’|b).   14
The expected value of Γ(h) under b is E(Γ(h)|b)=Σz∈Z p(z|h,b)u(z). 
Furthermore, E(Γ(∅)|b)= E(Γ|b)   
xi)  for all x∈X the conditional (to X) belief of being at history x, when 
DM adopts strategy b, is α(x|b).    
 
Throughout the paper we shall assume the following.  
 
Assumption 5 E(Γ|b)=V(Γ|b) 
 
As we shall see, because of the main behavioural assumptions, the 
above would not necessarily be true for proper subgames.  Finally, we also 
need the notions below  
 
Definition 2 In Γ =<H,u,C,ρ,Π> the Successors and Predecessors of history h are 
defined as follows.   
(i)  (Successors) For each h∈H-Z  the set of its 1-step successors is defined 
as S(1,h)={h’∈H |h’= (h,a) for all a∈A(h)}. The n-step successors of h 
are defined iteratively as follows S(n,h)={h’’∈H |h’’= (h’,a) for all 
a∈A(h’) and h’∈S(n-1,h)}, with n=2,3,… 
(ii)  (Predecessors) For each h∈H-∅, its 1-step predecessor is defined as 
P(1,h)={h’∈H|h∈S(1,h’)}.  The n-step predecessor of h is defined 
iteratively as follows P(n,h)={h’’∈H| h∈S(n,h’’)}. 
   15
4. DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY  
 
  In this section we define the general notion of dynamic consistency and 
provide generalised versions of Assumptions 3 and 4. We begin with the 
definition of ex-ante optimality.  
 
Definition 3 (Ex-Ante Optimality) A behavioural strategy b∈B is ex-ante optimal if  
V(Γ|b) ≥ V(Γ|b’) 
 for all b’∈B.  
 
We now formalise dynamic consistency 
  
Definition 4 (Dynamic Consistency) A behavioural strategy b∈B is dynamically 
consistent if for every information set X that is reached with positive probability 
under b is 
V(X|b) ≥ V(X|b’) 
 for all b’∈B.   
 
  The definition of dynamic consistency adopted here is an immediate 
generalisation of the one discussed earlier; it simply stipulates that 
consistency is the case whenever at each information set reached with positive 
probability the DM has no incentive to change an ex-ante adopted strategy. 
Below we generalise Assumptions 3 and 4 ; more specifically, the extensions 
are given by Assumptions 7 and 8.      16
 
Assumption 6 For all information sets X is V(X|b*)=Σx∈Xα(x|b*)V(Γ(x)|b*).  
 
Assumption 7  At any history x in X the DM thinks that her game value at all 
histories X is the same and equal to V(X|b*). Moreover, 
V(Γ(x)|b*)= Σ{h’∈S(1,x)∩ X} p(h’|x,b’)V(X|b*) + Σ{h’∈S(1,x)-X} p(h’|x,b’)E(Γ(h’)|b’) 
 
At any history in X to calculate V(Γ(x)|b*), for all x∈X, the DM reasons 
as follows. From x, in one step, she can either move to histories within X or to 
histories outside X. The former possibility can occur with probability 
Σ{h’∈S(1,x)∩ X} p(h’|x,b’) and, because of Assumption 7, at any such h’ would give 
rise to a game evaluation of V(X|b*). The latter instead will occur with an 
overall probability Σ{h’∈S(1,x)-X} p(h’|x,b’) and, at all such h’, gives rise to game 
evaluations equal to the expected values E(Γ(h’)|b’). On this last point we 
shall come back in the final section.  
 
Assumption 8 α(x|b*)=p(x|b*)/p(X|b*), where p(X|b*)=∑x∈Xp(x|b*).  
 
In words, upon having reached the information set X, the DM has a 
(conditional belief) to be at a node x∈X that, within the set itself, is consistent 
with the strategy adopted at X, generically indicated by b’. Clearly, in so far as 
those nodes in X which are reached from outside the set are concerned, the 
(conditional) belief must be consistent with the strategy adopted prior to   17
reaching X, generically indicated by b. Notice that in the AMD and GAMD 
this last point does not appear to be an issue since the information set is 
reached with probability one. As for the rest, the definition of α(x|b*) is fully 
analogous to one given by P&R.  
 
5. THE MAIN RESULT 
 
We are now capable to state the main theorem of the paper establishing 
dynamic consistency.   
 
Theorem Assume that in Γ=<H,u,C=∅,Π> assumptions 1-2 and 6-8 hold. Then if 
b∈B is ex-ante optimal is dynamically consistent.  
 
Proof  Assume that, when implementing b, X can be reached with positive 
probability. Then  
 
V(Γ|b)=E(Γ|b) = Σz∈Z p(z|b)u(z) = Σz∈Z-Z(X) p(z|b)u(z)+ Σz∈Z(X) p(z|b)u(z) 
 
where Z(X) ⊆ Z is made of those terminal histories having at least one prefix 
ending in X. Moreover,   
 
V(Γ|b)=Σz∈Z-Z(X) p(z|b)u(z)+ Σh∈X  p(h|b)E(Γ(h)|b)        (1) 
   18
where X={h∈X|P(n,h)∉X for all n∈N}.  
 
It is however more convenient to write V(Γ|b) as follows 
 
V(Γ|b)=Σz∈Z-Z(X) p(z|b)u(z)+ p(X|b)Σh∈X p(h|b)E(Γ(h)|b)/p(X|b)  (2) 
 
where p(X|b)=Σx∈X p(x|b). 
 
From Assumptions 6-8 we have that  
 
V(X|b*)= Σh∈X p(h|b) Σ{x∈Γ (h)∩X} p(x|h,b’)[Σ{h’∈S(1,x)∩ X} p(h’|x,b’)V(X|b*) + 
Σ{h’∈S(1,x)-X} p(h’|x,b’)E(Γ(h’)|b’)]/ p(X|b*) 
 
and   
 
V(X|b*)=Σh∈X p(h|b)Σ{h’∈H-X|P(1,h’)∈ Γ(h)∩X} p(h’|h,b’) E(Γ(h’)|b’)/[1-Σh∈X 
p(h|b)Σ{x∈Γ (h)∩X-{h}} p(x|h,b’)] 
 
so that  
 
V(X|b*)=Σh∈X p(h|b)E(Γ(h)|b*)/ p(X|b) 
   19
As a consequence, from (2) it  is b∈ argmax b*∈B V(X|b*). Indeed, if this was not 
so, b could not be the ex-ante optimal strategy. Since this holds true for any 
information set X,  reachable with positive probability by b, dynamic 
consistency follows.  
 
 
5.  PERSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Before concluding the paper, it could be interesting a brief discussion 
on possible alternative ways to model the DM reasoning at information sets. 
In particular, Assumption 7 stipulates that, from an history in X, the 
continuation value of the game when passing to an history h outside X is 
given by the expected value, under the possibly revised behavioural strategy 
b’, of the subgame starting from h.   
However, we could also contemplate that at any X the DM would 
anticipate the kind of reasoning that she will entertain later in the game at all 
information sets, possibly exhibiting absentmindedness. Though a complete 
analysis of the point is not of central interest to the paper, we think it worth to 
exemplify the matter and illustrate how consistency could still follow. 
Consider the problem in Fig. 2 below, an extension of Fig. 1 problem.  
 
Insert Fig 2 about here 
   20
In it the DM can not distinguish between nodes I and II and between 
nodes  III and IV. So there are two information sets, say X and Y, where 
X={I,II} and Y={III,IV}. If in the ex-ante calculations p and q are the 
probabilities of c, respectively, in X and Y, then the (ex-ante) expected payoff 
is  
 
Π(p,q)=(1-p)V0 + p(1-p)V1+ p2(1-q)V2+p2q(1-q)V3+p2q2V4     (3) 
 
and the optimal probabilities p* and q* maximise (3) in p and q.       
Upon reaching X let now p’ and q’ be the (possibly) revised 
probabilities, α again the conditional (to X) belief to be at node I and β the 
conditional (to Y) belief to be at node III4.  
Then, if Π(X;p’,q’) is the game value at X and Π(Y;p’,q’) the game value 
at Y we have  
 
Π(X;p’,q’)= α[p’Π(X;p’,q’)+(1-p’)V0]+(1-α)[p’Π(Y;p’,q’)+(1-p’)V1]       (4) 
 
Π(Y;p’,q’)= β[q’Π(Y;p’,q’)+(1-q’)V2]+(1-β)[(1-q’)V3+q’V4]                    (5) 
 
The term p’ Π (Y;p’,q’) on the RHS of (4) formalises the above 
considerations; at X the DM anticipates that upon reaching Y she will perform 
                                                 
4 The DM reasoning concerning the possibility of strategy revision 
upon Y being reached, which in this case would only pertain the possible 
updating of q’, will be analogous to the example of Fig.1 and so omitted.  
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a similar kind of reasoning. Hence, at node II she will evaluate the 
continuation of the game by Π(Y;p’,q’) rather than by the expected value (1-
q’)V2+q’(1-q’)V3+(q’)2 V4.  




Solving the system (4)-(5) immediately entails that  
 
Π(X;p’,q’)=(1-p’)V0 + p’(1-p’)V1 + (p’)2(1-q’)V2+ (p’)2(q’)(1-q’)V3 + (p’)2(q’)2V4  (6) 
 
and so p** and q**, the optimal conditional (to X) probabilities, will be found 
by maximising the above expression relatively to (respectively) p’ and q’. 
Since expressions (3) and (6), as functions of the pairs (p,q) and (p’,q’), are the 
same dynamic consistency would follow as p*=p** and q*=q**.  
In this paper we have generalised to a large class of finite extensive 
form decision problems, where nature is not present, an approach to 
individual choice formation originally suggested by Dimitri (1999) and Segal 
(2000). The main theorem that we obtain is a general result of dynamically 
consistent choices, an individual might entertain within a decision problem in 
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